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Abstract. We model the interbank market for overnight credit with hetero-
geneous banks and asymmetric information. An unsophisticated bank just
trades to compensate its liquidity imbalance, while a sophisticated bank will
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is shown that with positive probability, the liquidity eﬀect (Hamilton, 1997)
is reversed, i.e., a liquidity drainage from the banking system may generate
an overall decrease in the market rate. The phenomenon does not disappear
when the number of banks increases. We also show that private informa-
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suggesting a conservative information policy from a central bank perspective.
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1. Introduction
Cash market parlance as well as empirical evidence suggest the existence
of a negative correlation between the daily rate for overnight credit in the
interbank market on the one hand and the aggregate outstanding liquidity
in the banking system on the other. This eﬀect, known as the liquidity eﬀect
(Hamilton [7]), will be recognized as a variation of the more conventional
theme that relatively scarcer commodities tend to be traded at relatively
higher prices.
In this paper, we point out the theoretical possibility of a liquidity eﬀect
bearing a reversed sign. In fact, that short-term interest rates do not always
reflect liquidity conditions in the interbank market is a phenomenon that,
while still undocumented in the empirical literature, apparently is not new
to central bankers in various currency areas. E.g., in the case of the euro
area, the final days of the reserve maintenance period March 24 to April 23,
2003 were characterized by ample liquidity conditions. This can be inferred
from the 4 bn euro recourse to the deposit facility on the last day of the
maintenance period, shown in Figure 1. Still, as exhibited in Figure 2, the
money market index EONIA stayed well above the target rate of 2.50 % for
most of the last two days. The reader will realize that if the market rate - place
Figures
1 and 2
here -
would reflect liquidity conditions properly, this should not be feasible: the
market must be informationally ineﬃcient (Grossman and Stiglitz [6]).
In the formal analysis, we consider an interbank market with heterogeneous
banks and asymmetric observability of individual liquidity positions. It is
shown that an aggregate liquidity inflow into (drainage from) the banking
system may be associated by an increase (decrease) in the market rate. As
the analysis shows, this possibility is created by adverse incentives for some
banks in the market. Specifically, there is an incentive to actively speculate
on the market rate in order to exploit valuable private information about
liquidity flows. As a consequence of such strategic behavior, the impounding
of information into prices is delayed, and the overnight rate may give an
incorrect signal of the aggregate liquidity situation in the market.
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The present paper can be considered as an application of a line of research
that was originated by Kyle [9]. This literature tackled the conceptual dif-
ficulties of modeling markets with asymmetrically informed participants by
using the metaphor of a market maker who is observing only an aggregate
of the order flow and who takes the residual position to clear the market.
What is new in our approach is that it takes account of the specific infor-
mation structure in the interbank market arising from the fact that banks
can usually observe only liquidity flows that run through their own balance
sheet.
The first model that incorporated asymmetric information in the context of
reserve management was Campbell [3], who studied the announcement ef-
fect of macro data on the Federal funds rate. The paper considers a finite
population of commercial banks which have to satisfy reserve requirements
on average over a two-day statement period. Individual banks may have a
preference for early fulfilment. However, this information is not observable
for the other banks. Campbell argues that under informational asymmetry,
individual banks mistake the stronger demand caused by higher reserve re-
quirements (with should aﬀect rates on diﬀerent days in the same way) for a
widespread preference towards early fulfilment (which aﬀects rates on diﬀer-
ent days in a heterogeneous manner). As a consequence, the public release of
information about aggregate reserve requirements may aﬀect the market rate
stronger under informational asymmetry than under complete information.4
Our set-up diﬀers from Campbell’s in that we allow for a heterogeneous
population of commercial banks. The assumption will be that some banks
are less professional in managing their reserves than others. Specifically, it
is assumed that “unsophisticated” banks ignore the averaging condition of
reserve requirements and trade in the interbankmarket to immediately adjust
4The literature on optimal reserve management by commercial banks, initiated by
contributions by Poole [10], Ho and Saunders [8], and others, is sometimes confounded in
a potentially misleading way with another strand of literature that focusses on issues such
as the insurance motive of interbank trading, the public good property of holding liquid
assets, and the problem of systemic risk. Early contributions in this vein are Bhattacharya
and Gale [2], and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri [1]. See DeBandt and Hartmann [4] for a
survey of this literature.
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their reserve balance to the required level. By following this simple rule, these
banks never build up positions, and avoid any speculation on short-term
interest rates. With some banks managing their reserves in a more defensive
way than others, however, a liquidity shock aﬀecting the whole system may
generate heterogeneous reactions by individual banks. The purpose of this
paper is to study the consequences of this behavioral heterogeneity on the
statistics of the market rate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the case of
a single sophisticated bank. Section 3 discusses volatility and variance of the
market rate. In Section 4, we extend our analysis to the case of an arbitrary
number of sophisticated banks. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. The
appendix contains proofs of the formal results.
2. A single sophisticated bank
The model follows the Kyle [9] tradition, yet with a number of modifications
that reflect the institutional specifics of liquidity management. As will be-
come apparent, the main diﬀerence to the established framework is the infor-
mation structure. The interpretation also diﬀers slightly from the traditional
framework. In particular, the traditional noise traders in the microstructure
tradition have here the interpretation of behaviorally unsophisticated banks.
To ease exposition, we will start with the case of a single sophisticated bank.
In fact, while this example allows an interpretation with finitely many un-
sophisticated banks, we will, for the sake of simplicity, also assume only one
unsophisticated bank.5
The example has the following set-up. Three counterparties participate in
the trading protocol of the money market, bank A, bank B, and a market
maker. There are three dates. On day 0, the market rate is r0. In the
morning of day 1, the liquidity managers of bank A and B are individually
informed about their idiosyncratic liquidity positions, and choose an order
5The choice of the Kyle framework is made mainly for analytical convenience. There
should be no major diﬃculty replicating our results in a Campbell-style model.
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volume. The market maker observes the aggregate order volume, sets a price
for day 1, and clears the market to break even. Finally, on day 2, the liquidity
situation becomes public information.
Between dates 0 and 1, there is a liquidity flow between each individual bank
and the non-bank sector caused by the autonomous deposit and withdrawal
decisons by individual bank customers. In addition, there is a flow between
bank A and B caused by money transfers. We denote the flow from bank A
to the non-bank sector by zA, the flow from bank B to the non-bank sector
by zB, and the flow from bank A to bank B by yAB, where flows can be
negative. It is assumed that the components of the shock, i.e., zA, zB, and
yAB are normally and independently distributed, with expected values
E[zA] = E[zB] = 0, E[yAB] = y,
and respective variances σ2A, σ
2
B, and σ
2
y. Fixing the expected flows between
individual commercial banks and the non-bank sector to zero is a mere nor-
malization. On the other hand, a systematic flow of liquidity y between
heterogeneous banks is consistent e.g. with the well-documented empirical
fact that smaller bank tend to be net providers of liquidity in the interbank
market (cf. [8]). Aggregate autonomous factors are given by
z = zA + zB,
where, following a widely used convention, a positive sign indicates a liquidity
drainage from the banking system, and a negative sign a liquidity inflow.
We assume that under symmetric and complete information about aggregate
liquidity conditions z, market participants expect the overnight rate to be
r(z), where r0(z) > 0.6 To keep the model tractable, we will use the first-
order approximation
r(z) = r0 + ρz, (1)
6E.g., in a corridor system, the liquidity situation at any given point of time after the
last open market operation in a given reserve maintenance period will be indicative about
the relative likelihood of reaching the top or bottom of the interest rate corridor. Invoking
the martingale hypothesis then generates the suggested behavior (cf. Woodford [12]).
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where ρ > 0 is an exogenous parameter measuring the liquidity eﬀect.
The realization of the liquidity shock at time 1 is observed by an individual
banks as a change to its respective reserve account balance. Thus, bank A
observes a liquidity outflow of
ezA = zA + yAB,
while bank B observes ezB = zB − yAB.
Banks are heterogeneous. Specifically, bank A is assumed to possess a so-
phisticated liquidity management, and to choose an order volume xA so as
to minimize net funding costs. In contrast, bank B is unsophisticated, and
just trades away any temporary imbalance on the reserve account. Thus, the
order volume of bank B will amount to7
xB = zB − yAB.
This kind of heterogeneous behavior is suggested by descriptive studies of
the money market (cf. [5], [11]).
An alternative justification is that banks may have position targets, which
enter the individual bank’s objective function (cf. Campbell [3]). A natural
target position for a bank could be defined in terms of having a balanced re-
serve account. The relative weight that the objective of staying close to the
target obtains in the bank’s objective function reflects then the willingness
to trade in the money market for speculative reasons. Our model replaces
the continuum of possible relative weights by just two extreme cases: the
sophisticated bank gives zero weight to the position target, while the unso-
phisticated bank gives full weight to the position target.
7In an alternative interpretation, bank B represents an aggregate of several unsophis-
ticated banks, and the liquidity variables zB and yAB represent the respective aggregate
net liquidity flows.
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Aggregate liquidity demand is then x = xA+xB. The market maker observes
x, and determines the competitive zero-profit market rate8
er(x) = E[r0 + ρz|x].
Proposition 1. An equilibrium in the interbank market for overnight credit
is constituted by the strategies
xA(ezA) = β(ezA − y)er(x) = r0 + λ(x+ y),
where β ∈ (0; 1), and
λ = ρ
βσ2A + σ
2
B
β2σ2A + σ
2
B + (1− β)2σ2y
. (2)
Proof. See the appendix.¶
It can be seen from Proposition 1 that the sophisticated bank never fully
accommodates its liquidity demand, i.e., β < 1. Instead, it hides some of its
excess liquidity or some of its liquidity deficit in order to not fully reveal its
liquidity situation to the market. In addition, the sophisticated bank takes
account of the fact that its reserve balance is distorted by the expected flow
to bank B. We will now derive conditions under which the strategic behavior
of the sophisticated bank implies a reversal of the liquidity eﬀect.9
A shock (zA, zB, yAB) to the banking system will be referred to as liquidity-
absorbing if zA+ zB > 0. (Recall our earlier sign convention for autonomous
8The reader might ask himself why we have to replace the general price mechanism by
the somewhat specific institution of a market maker. Note, however, that under asym-
metric information, individual traders have little incentive to reveal their true willingness
to trade. As a consequence, the Walrasian auctioneer, announcing prices in order to elicit
demand and supply, may be unable to clear the market in the usual tatonnement process.
9While we have not stressed this point so far, the model is perfectly consistent with
an interpretation where individual banks have to satisfy reserve requirements on average
over a two-day statement period. To see why, note that at the very end of day 2, typically
only one side of the market can be satisfied, and the residual demand or supply will be
cleared by usage of central bank facilities. E.g., if aggregate demand exceeds supply, all
banks may deposit excess liquidity in the interbank market. However, some banks may
end up with a reserve deficit, and will have recourse to the central bank’s lending facility.
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factors). It should be clear that the interbank flow yAB does not appear in
this definition because it does not aﬀect aggregate liquidity conditions. From
Proposition 1, we know that a shock induces a decline in the equilibrium rate
if the aggregate order volume is below average, i.e., if
xA(ezA) + xB(ezB) < −y.
This latter condition is equivalent, again by Proposition 1, to
β(ezA − y) + ezB < −y,
or
βzA + zB − (1− β)(yAB − y) < 0.
We have shown in Proposition 1 that β ∈ (0; 1). Thus, for a liquidity-
absorbing shock (zA, zB, yAB) to induce the market rate to fall, it suﬃces to
simultaneously satisfy the following conditions:
zA > 0
−zA < zB < −βzA
yAB ≥ y
As these conditions describe a set of strictly positive measure in the three-
dimensional euclidean space of liquidity shocks, we have shown a special case
of the central result of our paper:
Proposition 2. For all parameter values of the model, there is a positive
probability that a liquidity shock will cause both a liquidity drainage and a
decreasing market rate.
Proof. See text above.¶
Proposition 2 says that the path that the market rate takes in response to a
newly established liquidity situation need not be monotonous: It may happen
that the initial development of the market rate goes into the direction oppo-
site to the one predicted by the liquidity eﬀect. Of course, a completely anal-
ogous derivation shows the robust possibility of a liquidity-providing shock
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to cause the market rate to increase. As we now want to show, this eﬀect
mitigates the expected uncertainty of short-term interest rates.
3. Volatility and variance
As the benchmark case, we consider a scenario where both banks act non-
strategically, i.e., the banks trade in the market with the sole intention of
rebalancing their reserve accounts immediately. In this case, total order
volume turns out to be
x = xA(ezA) + xB(ezB)
= zA + yAB + zB − yAB
= z,
i.e., equal to the liquidity imbalance caused to the overall banking system.
The market maker therefore obtains complete information about the aggre-
gate liquidity situation of the banking system vis-à-vis the non-bank sector,
and sets the price on day 1 equal to the full-information rate r(z). Thus, in
the benchmark setting with unsophisticated behavior by both banks, we ob-
tain a change in the market rate between day 0 and day 1 equaling r(z)− r0,
and no change between day 1 and day 2 (see Figure 3). The volatility of the - place
Figure
3
here -
sequence of market rates (i.e., the ex-ante expected average standard devi-
ation of the price increment between two consecutive trading days) in the
absence of strategic behavior is therefore given by
vu =
1
2
STD(r(z)− r0).
We compare this benchmark volatility with the volatility in the original set-
up with one sophisticated and one unsophisticated bank. Here, the price on
day 1 is er(x), where
x = xA(ezA) + xB(ezB),
and the price on day 2 is r(z). Thus, the volatility in a market with strategic
behavior is given by
vs =
1
2
{STD(er(x)− r0) + STD(r(z)− er(x))}.
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It turns out that strategic money trading increases the volatility of the price
process.
Proposition 3. For all parameter values of the model, vs > vu.
Proof. See the appendix.¶
The idea of the proof is to show that with sophisticated traders in the mar-
ket, the day-to-day changes of the overnight rate must be uncorrelated. In-
tuitively, if theses changes were correlated, this would mean a predictable
pattern in the price path, leaving room for profitable arbitrage opportunities.
With strategic traders in the market, this cannot be the case. In contrast,
when all banks in the market care only for a balanced reserve position at the
end of day 1, then this will produce autocorrelation in the price path, which
reduces the volatility measure.
We will now turn to the question of how the procrastinated trading of some
banks will aﬀect monetary policy implementation. The interpretation will be
that the central bank has installed neutral liquidity conditions on day 0 (e.g.,
by making the benchmark allotment in the last tender of the maintenance
period), and that the market rate r0 on that day corresponds to the target
rate. With this interpretation in mind, we will now define the expected
quadratic average from the target rate on day 1. Day 2 can be neglected
in the discussion of interest rate targeting because the full-information rate
prevails by assumption. In the benchmark case of two unsophisticated banks,
the rate on day 1 will be the full-information rate, i.e., r(z), so that the
expected quadratic deviation from the target rate is given by
V u = E[(r(z)− r0)2].
In contrast, with one sophisticated bank, the partial-information rate er(x)
will prevail on day 1, so that the quadratic deviation amounts to
V s = E[(er(x)− r0)2].
Using the previous results, we can show that strategic behavior lowers the
expected deviation from the interest rate target.
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Proposition 4. For all parameter values of the model, V s < V u.
Proof. See the appendix.¶
Thus, and in mild contrast to the above finding on the volatility, it turns
out that the average quadratic deviation from the interest rate r0 is smaller
in the presence of sophisticated behavior. If r0 is interpreted as the central
bank’s target rate then this finding says that the informational ineﬃciency
may in fact be supportive to the objectives of monetary policy implementa-
tion. This leads us to the conclusion that the provision of public information
about aggregate liquidity conditions after the last refinancing operation may
in fact be detrimental to monetary policy implementation. This finding may
explain why the ECB has released this information only immediately before
an individual refinancing operation.
4. Extension to N sophisticated and M unsophisticated banks
Consider now the general case of N ≥ 0 sophisticated banks i = 1, ..., N
and of M ≥ 1 unsophisticated banks i = N + 1, ..., N +M . See Figure 4
for illustration. We will use the convention that unless indicated otherwise, - place
Figure
4
here -
the parameter i runs over all N +M banks. Denote the liquidity flows from
bank i to the non-bank sector by zi, and the liquidity flow from bank i to
bank j by yij, where yij = −yji. The expected value of the liquidity outflow
from an individual firm to the non-bank sector is assumed to be E[zi] = 0
for simplicity. For the expected interbank flow from bank i to bank j, we
will write
E[yij] = yij.
For reasons of tractability, it will turn out to be useful to impose impose cer-
tain symmetry restrictions on the variances of the involved liquidity flows.10
Specifically, the variances of the flows from individual banks to the non-bank
sector are assumed to be identical within the groups of sophisticated and
10Dropping these restrictions leads to a generic system of N quadratic equations in N
variables, which typically does not allow an explicit solution.
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unsophisticated banks, respectively, i.e.,
V AR(zi) =
½
σ2s for i = 1, ..., N
σ2u for i = N + 1, ..., N +M .
Moreover, the variances of the flows between two individual banks are as-
sumed to be the same if either both banks are sophisticated, or both banks
are unsophisticated or one bank is, and the other is not. Thus, we assume
V AR(yij) =



σ2ss for i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}
σ2uu for i, j ∈ {N + 1, ..., N +M}
σ2su otherwise
.
As before, bank i observes the balance of its reserve account, i.e.,
ezi = zi +X
j 6=i
yij.
(Recall our earlier convention that says here that the sum runs over all banks
j = 1, ..., N +M , leaving i out). For ease of notation, we will write
yi =
X
j 6=i
yij
for the total liquidity flow from bank i to other banks in the system. Clearly,
the expected liquidity imbalance for bank i is
E[ezi] =X
j 6=i
yij =: yi.
When aggregating over flows, we find that the total flow of liquidity from the
sophisticated to the non-sophisticated banks is given by
y :=
NX
i=1
yi = −
N+MX
i=N+1
yi.
This statistics will play a certain role in the subsequent analysis. The problem
of a sophisticated bank i = 1, ..., N is to maximize expected profits from
speculation
πi(xi) = E[(r(z)− er(x))xi|ezi].
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Individual order flow for bank i is denoted by xi(ezi). Aggregate order flow is
then
x =
NX
i=1
xi(ezi) + N+MX
i=N+1
ezi.
With these specifications, the equilibrium analysis of the model generalizes
in a straightforward way as follows.
Proposition 5. An equilibrium in the interbank market for overnight credit
is constituted by strategies
xi(ezi) = β(ezi − yi) (3)
for i+ 1, ..., N , and er(x) = r0 + λ(x+ y), (4)
where β ∈ (0; 1) and
λ = ρ
Nβσ2s +Mσ
2
u
Nβ2σ2s +Mσ2u + (1− β)2NMσ2su
. (5)
Proof. See the appendix.¶
We continue with the discussion of the reversal of the liquidity eﬀect in the
case of finitely many sophisticated banks. Generalizing our earlier definition,
we will say that a shock ({zi}i=1,...,N+M , {yij}i>j) to the banking system is
liquidity-absorbing if
z =
N+MX
i=1
zi > 0.
According to Proposition 5, the market rate will fall in consequence of a
liquidity shock if and only if the aggregate order flow is smaller than its ex-
pected value. Formally, this conditions is true if x < −y. As total order flow
is the sum of sophisticated and unsophisticated demand, this is tantamount
to
β
NX
i=1
(ezi − zi) + N+MX
i=N+1
ezi < −y.
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Using the definition of ezi and rearranging gives
βzs + zu + (1− β)(y − y) < 0,
where
zs =
NX
i=1
zi,
zu =
N+MX
i=N+1
zi
are the flows of liquidity to the non-bank sector aggregated about sophisti-
cated and unsophisticated banks, respectively.
As in the case of a single sophisticated bank, the eﬀect is driven by β ∈
(0; 1). E.g., for a liquidity-absorbing shock ({zi}i=1,...,N+M , {yij}i>j) to induce
the market rate to fall, it suﬃces to simultaneously satisfy the following
conditions:
zs > 0 (6)
−zs < zu < −βzs (7)
y ≤ y. (8)
These conditions specify again a subset in the space of liquidity shocks of
strictly positive measure, so that we have generalized Proposition 2 to an
arbitrary number of sophisticated banks. In fact, Propositions 3 and 4 ex-
tends likewise in a straightforward manner to the generalized set-up when
we note that the definitions of volatility and variance of the market rate are
well-defined also in the generalized model. We summarize our findings as
follows.
Proposition 6. With finitely many strategic banks, there is a positive prob-
ability that a liquidity drainage causes the market rate to fall. On average,
the volatility of the market rate is larger, while the quadratic deviation from
the neutral rate r0 is smaller in the presence of sophisticated liquidity man-
agement.
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Proof. See the appendix.¶
With potentially many commercial banks persuing essentially independent
operations with their respective clients, the question arises as to whether the
reversal of the liquidity eﬀect would disappear if the number of banks oper-
ating in the currency area is only suﬃciently large. It turns out that this is
not the case. To see why, let the size N +M of the banking population go
to infinity, keeping approximately constant fractions α and 1− α of sophis-
ticated and unsophisticated banks, respectively. Clearly, any enlargement of
the population reduces the informational role that the market order of an
individual bank has on the overnight rate. Thus, any manipulative motive of
a single bank for strategic trading is marginalized as the population grows.
However, for an individual bank, the informational advantage is still of some
value. On average, speculating on this information yields a positive profit so
that the individual bank takes a position in its own interest even when the
population is large. This makes the reversal of the liquidity eﬀect a robust
phenomenon that can be present also in very large markets.
Proposition 7. In the limit economy with a constant fraction α of sophis-
ticated banks, sophisticated banks behave strategically with β∞ ∈ (0; 1), and
there is a strictly positive probability for a reversal of the liquidity eﬀect.
Proof. See the appendix.¶
5. Conclusion
We have modified the Kyle [9] framework to capture some institutional as-
pects of the interbank market for overnight liquidity. Main assumptions
included heterogeneous levels of sophistication in commercial banks’ liquid-
ity management, as well as an asymmetric information distribution resulting
from a decentralized realization of an autonomous factor shock. It has been
shown that under these conditions, the liquidity eﬀect may be overthrown
in the sense that a liquidity drainage from the banking system may induce
the market rate to decrease. The reason is that banks with a sophisticated
15
liquidity management exploit the averaging condition on reserve holdings
and procrastinate their balancing of true liquidity needs, so that information
is impounded into prices only with a certain delay. As a consequence, the
squared deviation from the target rate is on average smaller in the absense
of aggregate information about market conditions when compared to a full
information set-up. This suggests the conclusion that a conservative infor-
mation policy may indeed be supportive for the implementation of monetary
policy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof has three steps. We first check the
optimality of bank A’s strategy, given the linear pricing rule and the unso-
phisticated behavior of bank B. Profits for bank A, conditional on observing
the realized liquidity imbalance ezA, are given by
E[(r(z)− er(x))xA|ezA] = E[{ρz − λ(x+ y)}xA|ezA]
= {ρE[z|ezA]− λ(xA +E[xB|ezA] + y)}xA,
where, by the projection theorem for normally distributed random variables,
E[z|ezA] = σ2Aσ2A + σ2y (ezA − y)
E[xB|ezA] = −y − σ2yσ2A + σ2y (ezA − y).
The corresponding first-order condition is
xA(ezA) = ρE[z|ezA]
2λ
− 1
2
(E[xB|ezA] + y).
Using the explicit expressions for the conditional expectations gives
xA(ezA) = β(ezA − y),
where
β =
ρ
2λ
σ2A
σ2A + σ2y
+
1
2
σ2y
σ2A + σ2y
. (9)
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We continue by checking the zero-profit or no-arbitrage condition for the
market maker, assuming a linear strategy for bank A, and liquidity-balancing
for bank B. Under these conditions,
E[r(z)|x] = r0 + ρE[z|x],
where, by another application of the projection theorem,
E[z|x] = COV (z, βzA + zB − (1− β)yAB)
V AR(βzA + zB − (1− β)yAB)
(x+ y)
=
βσ2A + σ
2
B
β2σ2A + σ
2
B + (1− β)2σ2y
(x+ y).
We show now that β ∈ (0; 1). Note first that λ > 0 by the second-order
condition for the sophisticated bank’s problem. From (9) then it follows that
β > 0. It therefore remains to be shown that β < 1. Plugging (2) into (9)
and rearranging yields the quadratic equation
β2 + β(2ζ + ξ)− (ζ + ξ) = 0, (10)
where ζ = σ2B/σ
2
A and ξ = σ
2
y/(σ
2
A + σ
2
y). This equation possesses a unique
positive root, given by
β(ζ, ξ) = −(ζ + ξ
2
) +
r
(ζ +
ξ
2
)2 + ζ + ξ.
If β ≥ 1, then the left-hand side of (10) is strictly positive, so we must have
β < 1.¶
Proof of Proposition 3. We start from the obvious triangle decomposition
r(z)− r0 = (r(z)− er(x)) + (er(x)− r0).
Hence,
V AR(r(z)− r0) = V AR(r(z)− er(x)) + V AR(er(x)− r0)
+ 2COV (r(z)− er(x), er(x)− r0).
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We will focus for the moment on the covariance term. Using
r(z)− r0 = ρ(zA + zB)er(x)− r0 = λ(βzA + zB − (1− β)(yAB − y)), (11)
and using the independence of zA, zB, and yAB, we obtain
COV (r(z)− er(x), er(x)− r0)
= λCOV (ρ(zA + zB)− λ(βzA + zB − (1− β)(yAB − y)),
βzA + zB − (1− β)(yAB − y))
= λ{β(ρ− βλ)σ2A + (ρ− λ)σ2B − λ(1− β)2σ2y}
= 0,
where we used (2) in the last equation. This yields
V AR(r(z)− r0) = V AR(r(z)− er(x)) + V AR(er(x)− r0).
Thus,
4(vs)2 = V AR(er(x)− r0) + V AR(r(z)− er(x))
+ 2STD(er(x)− r0)STD(r(z)− er(x))
> V AR(er(x)− r0) + V AR(r(z)− er(x))
= V AR(r(z)− r0)
= 4(vu)2,
proving the assertion.¶
Proof of Proposition 4. By definition,
V u = E[(r(z)− r0)2]
= ρ2E[(zA + zB)2]
= ρ2(σ2A + σ
2
B).
18
On the other hand, by (11) and (2), we get
V s = E[(er(x)− r0)2]
= λ2E[{βzA + zB − (1− β)(yAB − y)}2]
= λ2{β2σ2A + σ2B + (1− β)2σ2y}
= ρ2
(βσ2A + σ
2
B)
2
β2σ2A + σ
2
B + (1− β)2σ2y
=
βσ2A + σ
2
B
σ2A + σ
2
B
βσ2A + σ
2
B
β2σ2A + σ
2
B + (1− β)2σ2y
V u.
The assertion then follows from β < 1.¶
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows the lines of the proof of Propo-
sition 1. The details are as follows. Assuming that the market maker’s
price-setting behavior (4) is common knowledge, expected profits for bank i,
for i = 1, ..., N , are given by
πi(xi) = E[(r(z)− er(x))xi|ezi]
= E[(ρz − λ(x+ y))xi|ezi]
= {ρE[z|ezi]− λ(xi +E[x−i|ezi] + y)}xi,
where
x−i =
X
j 6=i
xj.
The corresponding first-order condition is
xi(ezi) = ρ
2λ
E[z|ezi]− 1
2
E[x−i|ezi]− y
2
, (12)
for i = 1, ..., N . We will now calculate the two expected values in (12). For
i = 1, ..., N , we have by the projection theorem that
E[z|ezi] = COV (z, ezi)V AR(ezi) (ezi −E[ezi])
=
σ2i
σ2i +
P
j 6=i σ
2
ij
(ezi − yi).
The second expected value is given by
E[x−i|ezi] = E[x−i] + COV (x−i, ezi)V AR(ezi) (ezi − yi),
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where
E[x−i] =
N+MX
j=N+1
yj = −y,
and the covariance and variance terms are given by
COV (x−i, ezi) = NX
j=1
j 6=i
COV (xj, ezi) + N+MX
j=N+1
COV (xj, ezi)
=
NX
j=1
j 6=i
COV (βj(zj +
X
k 6=j
yjk), zi +
X
l 6=i
yil)+
+
N+MX
j=N+1
COV (zj +
X
k 6=j
yjk, zi +
X
l 6=i
yil)
=
NX
j=1
j 6=i
βjCOV (yji, yij) +
N+MX
j=N+1
COV (yji, yij)
= −
NX
j=1
j 6=i
βjσ2ij −
N+MX
j=N+1
σ2ij,
and by
V AR(ezi) = σ2i +X
j 6=i
σ2ij.
Thus, from (12), we get (3), where the vector (β1, ..., βN) is the solution of
the system of equations
2βi =
1
σ2i +
P
j 6=i σ
2
ij
{ρ
λ
σ2i +
NX
j=1
j 6=i
βjσ2ij +
N+MX
j=N+1
σ2ij}, (13)
for i = 1, ..., N . In the symmetric set-up, to which we refined ourselves earlier
above, this leads to
2β =
σ2s(ρ/λ) + (N − 1)βσ2ss +Mσ2su
σ2s + (N − 1)σ2ss +Mσ2su
. (14)
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Next, we check the zero-profit condition for the market maker. We find that
E[r(z)|x] = r0 + ρE[z|x] (15)
= r0 + ρ
COV (z, x)
V AR(x)
(x−E[x]),
where
COV (z, x) = COV (
N+MX
i=1
zi,
NX
j=1
xj(ezj)) + COV (N+MX
i=1
zi,
N+MX
j=N+1
ezj)
= COV (
N+MX
i=1
zi,
NX
j=1
βjzj) + COV (
N+MX
i=1
zi,
N+MX
j=N+1
zj)
=
NX
i=1
βiσ2i +
N+MX
i=N+1
σ2i ,
and
V AR(x) = V AR(
NX
i=1
xi(ezi) + N+MX
i=N+1
ezi)
= V AR(
NX
i=1
βi(zi +
X
j 6=i
yij) +
N+MX
i=N+1
(zi +
X
j 6=i
yij))
=
NX
i=1
β2i σ
2
i +
N+MX
i=N+1
σ2i + V AR(
NX
i=1
βi
X
j 6=i
yij +
N+MX
i=N+1
X
j 6=i
yij)
=
N+MX
i=1
β2i σ
2
i +
X
i>j
(βi − βj)2σ2ij,
where we let βi := 1 for i = N + 1, ..., N +M . Moreover, we have
E[x] = E[
NX
i=1
βi(zi +
X
j 6=i
(yij − yij) +
N+MX
i=N+1
(zi +
X
j 6=i
yij)]
=
N+MX
i=N+1
X
j 6=i
yij = −y.
Using this information, (15) implies (4), where
λ = ρ
PN+M
i=1 βiσ
2
iPN+M
i=1 β
2
i σ
2
i +
P
i>j(βi − βj)2σ2ij
.
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The symmetric set-up implies (5). Combining (14) and (5) yields the quadratic
equation
β2 + (A+B)β −B = 0, (16)
for constants A > 0 and B > 0. Thus, as in the proof of Proposition 1, there
is a unique positive root β < 1.¶
Proof of Proposition 6. The first assertion is proved in the text before the
Proposition. For the second assertion, recall from the proof of Proposition 2
that it suﬃces to show that
COV (r(z)− er(x), er(x)− r0) = 0.
From (1) and (4), we obtain
COV (r(z)− er(x), er(x)− r0)
= COV (ρz − λ(x+ y), λ(x+ y))
= COV (ρ
N+MX
i=1
zi − λ
N+MX
i=1
βi(zi + yi), λ
N+MX
i=1
βi(zi + yi))
= λCOV (
N+MX
i=1
{zi(ρ− λβi)− λβiyi},
N+MX
i=1
βi(zi + yi))
= λ{
N+MX
i=1
(ρ− λβi)βiσ2i − λ
X
i>j
(βi − βj)2σ2ij}
= λ{N(ρ− βλ)βσ2s +M(ρ− λ)σ2u −NM(1− β)2σ2su}
= 0,
where we used (5) in the last equation. This proves the assertion concerning
the volatility. As for the quadratic deviation from the neutral rate r0, we
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have
V s = E[(er(x)− r0)2]
= λ2E[{
NX
i=1
β(zi + yi − yi) +
N+MX
i=N+1
(zi + yi) + y}2]
= λ2E[{βzs + zu − (1− β)(y − y)}2]
= λ2{Nβ2σ2s +Mσ2u − (1− β)2NMσ2su}
= ρ2
(Nβσ2s +Mσ
2
u)
2
Nβ2σ2s +Mσ2u + (1− β)2NMσ2su
=
Nβσ2s +Mσ
2
u
Nσ2s +Mσ2u
Nβσ2s +Mσ
2
u
Nβ2σ2s +Mσ2u + (1− β)2NMσ2su
V u
> V u,
where we have used
V u = E[(r(z)2 − r0)2]
= ρ2(Nσ2s +Mσ
2
u)
and β ∈ (0, 1). This proves the assertion concerning the variance, and thereby
the Proposition.¶
Proof of Proposition 7. Let βN,M be the solution to the quadratic equation
(16) in a model with N sophisticated and M unsophisticated banks. A
short calculation shows that the parameters in the corresponding quadratic
equation are given by
AN,M =
Mσ2sσ
2
u +M(N − 1)σ2uσ2ss +M2σ2uσ2su
Nσ2u +N(N − 1)σ2sσ2ss +NMσ2sσ2su
BN,M =
Mσ2sσ
2
u +MNσ
2
sσ
2
su +M
2σ2uσ
2
su
Nσ2u +N(N − 1)σ2sσ2ss +NMσ2sσ2su
.
Thus, letting N and M going simultaneously to infinity, ensuring
N
M
≈ α
1− α ,
we obtain limit values
A∞ =
(1− α)σ2u
ασ2s
B∞ =
(1− α)σ2su
ασ2s
ασ2s + (1− α)σ2u
ασ2ss + (1− α)σ2su
.
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Thus, the limit of the roots β∞ = limβN,M is strictly contained in the open
interval (0; 1). To prove the second part of the assertion, note that the
individual distributions of the aggregate, the independent flows
zN,Ms :=
NX
i=1
zi,
zN,Mu :=
N+MX
i=N+1
zi
are both normally distributed with expectation value zero. Standard devia-
tions are given by
STD(zN,Ms ) =
√
Nσs ≈
√
α
√
N +Mσs,
STD(zN,Mu ) =
√
Mσu ≈
√
1− α
√
N +Mσu.
As the population grows, i.e., when N +M increases, keeping the respective
proportions of sophisticated and unsophisticated banks approximately con-
stant, the joint density of the random vector (zN,Ms , z
N,M
u ) is merely rescaled
by the common factor 1/
√
N +M . Thus, as the suﬃcient conditions (6)
through (8) for a reversal of the liquidity eﬀect are invariant with respect
to re-scaling for a fixed β := β∞, we find that the probability of a shock
satisfying these conditions remains bounded away from zero for a growing
population size.¶
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Figure 1. Net marginal lending (deposit if negative) during the example period.
Figure 2. Intraday-behavior of the overnight rate on the last two days of the example period.
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Figure 3. Volatility of the market rate; example: liquidity drainage.
Figure 4. Visualization of the generalized model.
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